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Abstract An insolvency administrator replaces the manager of an insolvent firm to
devise and organize a liquidation or reorganization plan in the creditors’ interest. In
the course of the process, the insolvency administrator presents the most favourable
option from his perspective, and the creditors choose to accept or reject this plan.
Conflicts of interest arise because the insolvency administrator, as the better-in-
formed party, considers in his proposal liability risks and reputational issues that are
beyond the creditors’ scope. We model this conflict as a Bayesian game and find
that, under those compensation schemes typically used in real-world regulations,
optimal creditor satisfaction and efficient decisions concerning the economic future
of the insolvent firm will never be achieved simultaneously.
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1 Introduction
The objective of a bankruptcy law concerns two primary aspects: first, it should
ensure optimal creditor satisfaction by exploiting the remaining assets of a bankrupt
firm, and second, it should separate viable from unviable bankrupt firms. However,
identifying the viability of firms is a difficult task, generating two types of errors:
Type I error occurs if unviable firms are restructured under court-supervised
reorganization. Type II error occurs when viable firms are liquidated instead of
reorganized (White 1994). These two errors constitute the filtering failure of an
insolvency procedure.
The literature discusses various reasons for this filtering failure. The most
commonly considered explanation is asymmetric information between creditors and
managers or equity holders, which impedes the information revelation process
regarding the true value of a financially distressed firm (Hotchkiss et al. 2008;
Giammarino 1989; Li and Li 1999; Mooradian 1994; White 1994). Further studies
analyse the influence of biased judges (Bris et al. 2005; Baird 1986) or the quality
and judicial discretion of judges on the ex post outcome of a bankruptcy procedure
(Ayotte and Yun 2007; Bernhardt and Nosal 2004). Another issue discussed in the
literature is the conflict of interest among multiple creditors (Blazy and Chopard
2004) or the problems due to multiple classes of creditors (Bulow and Shoven 1978;
White 1989; Gertner and Scharfstein 1991).
This paper addresses the individual incentives of a better-informed insolvency
administrator as an additional source of filtering failure. We incorporate asymmetric
information, individual concerns, such as liability risks or reputational issues, and
insolvency administrator remuneration in a stylized model in which the interactions
between the insolvency administrator and the creditors of a company are analysed.
Our key contribution is that the insolvency administrator compensation schemes
typically used in insolvency law will not imply optimal creditor satisfaction and the
absence of filtering failure simultaneously. The main driver of this result is the
information asymmetry between the involved parties in combination with the
individual concerns of the insolvency administrator. The insolvency administrator
will always report the true viability of the bankrupt firm and will always propose the
correct resolution of a bankruptcy under an appropriate compensation scheme.
However, providing these incentives is not optimal from the creditor’s perspective.
Besides from compensation schemes typically used in insolvency law, we derive
a compensation scheme that simultaneously implies optimal creditor satisfaction
and no filtering failure as a benchmark. However, such a scheme heavily depends on
the unverifiable preferences of the individual insolvency administrator and will
therefore not be implementable as a general regulation. We argue that regulatory
measures addressing liability risk or the role of reputation are more appropriate to
enhance the efficiency of insolvency proceedings.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the influence of
insolvency administrators’ incentives on the ex post efficiency of a bankruptcy law.
This article contributes to the theoretical literature on the information asymmetry
among creditors, owner-managers and third parties such as judges as a source of
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filtering failure. White (1994) investigates the filtering properties of U.S. bankruptcy
law. In that model, a manager can decide to file for Chapter 11 or Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and the results indicate that pooling equilibria exist in which efficient
and inefficient bankrupt firms reorganize under chapter 11 and, therefore, Type I
errors occur. Furthermore, Giammarino (1989) and Li and Li (1999) study how a
formal bankruptcy procedure can help resolve the information problem between a
manager/firm and a creditor. They analyse whether it is optimal to incur costs due to
a bankruptcy procedure, given the existence of the costless alternative of a private
renegotiation. The role of bankruptcy law is to force information disclosure and to
resolve information asymmetry. In contrast to these papers, we analyse the
information revelation process within a court-supervised procedure after private
renegotiation between the firm and its creditors has failed. Moreover, we consider
the relationship between an insolvency administrator and a creditor.
Ayotte and Yun (2007) analyse the effect of the quality of judges or insolvency
administrators on the ex post outcome of a bankruptcy procedure. They find that
judicial expertise is necessary when creditors are biased, using the following
argumentation: When creditors are biased towards liquidation, a more debtor-
friendly bankruptcy law in which management is allowed to retain some control will
be efficient. Therefore, this freedom in managers’ decisions necessarily requires
judicial expertise to separate viable and unviable bankrupt firms. In contrast, if the
judges’ ability to identify viable firms is low, a more creditor-friendly bankruptcy
law will be optimal. Bernhardt and Nosal (2004) also analyse how judicial
discretion influences the outcome of a bankruptcy. They show that some judicial
error can enhance the ex post efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure due to better ex
ante actions on the part of management. In contrast, we investigate the influence of
the insolvency administrator’s remuneration on the ex post outcome and do not
distinguish different qualities or discretion of an insolvency administrator.
Moreover, in our model, an insolvency administrator has divergent incentives from
those of a judge. The insolvency administrator is not employed by the government,
is personally liable for his decisions and needs a good reputation to be assigned to
future insolvency procedures.
A second strand of the literature empirically examines the reasons for ex post
inefficiency. For example, Djankov et al. (2008) use a case study presented to
lawyers in 88 countries to measure the concrete extent of inefficiency. They find that
bankruptcy procedures in all countries are highly inefficient. Therefore, the main
reasons for inefficiency are high administrative costs and long time delays. The
study contains several countries with an insolvency administrator as an integral part
of the bankruptcy procedure, but they do not separately analyse how the insolvency
administrator should be remunerated. Only one empirical study considers the
influence of an insolvency administrator’s compensation scheme on the bankruptcy
outcome. Using Hungarian data, Franks and Loranth (2013) find an impact of the
insolvency administrator’s remuneration on the satisfaction of creditors and argue
that one reason for high bankruptcy costs might be the structure of the remuneration
scheme for insolvency administrators. Our paper can be understood as a theoretical
basis for the inefficiencies mentioned in Franks and Loranth (2013).
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the role
and the remuneration of the insolvency administrator in the German Insolvency
Code. Section 3 presents the model, and Sect. 4 analyses the different equilibria of
the game. Section 5 analyses the efficiency of the insolvency administrator’s
compensation. Some implications for the regulation of insolvency procedures are
discussed in Sect. 6, and the final section concludes the paper.
2 The German insolvency procedure
The insolvency administrator is of particular importance in the German Insolvency
Code; therefore, we use the German insolvency procedure as the basis for our
analysis. Nonetheless, our study is not limited to Germany, as insolvency
administrators are common in many insolvency codes.1 German insolvency
proceedings begin after creditors or the management of the bankrupt firm declare
insolvency. The reasons for such a declaration are illiquidity, impeding illiquidity or
over-indebtedness (Sec. 16 et seq. Insolvenzordnung (InsO)). In a next step, an
insolvency judge examines whether the remaining assets are sufficient to cover the
insolvency costs (Sec. 26 InsO and Haarmeyer, in: Kirchhof et al. (2014), to Sec.
26, Note 11) and delegates the responsibility and management of the bankrupt firm
to an insolvency administrator (Sec. 27 (1) InsO). Thereafter, the insolvency
administrator must continue operations, secure remaining assets and develop
options for the future of the firm. During this time, the insolvency administrator
privately obtains information about the viability and conditions of the firm and
therefore learns whether a liquidation or continuation of the bankrupt firm is
beneficial.
At most three months after the beginning of the insolvency procedure, the
insolvency administrator reports on the potential future options for the bankrupt firm
at the creditors’ meeting (Sec. 156 InsO). On the basis of this report, creditors
decide to liquidate and shut down the firm or to continue the firm. Furthermore, they
can enable the insolvency administrator to devise an insolvency plan (Sec. 157
InsO). The main purpose of such an insolvency plan is the development of a detailed
proposal on how the bankrupt firm can be reorganized.
According to German bankruptcy law, an insolvency administrator’s compen-
sation depends on the total amount of the insolvency assets realized in the
insolvency procedure and on the compensation parameters defined by the
insolvency code. The monetary compensation is typically defined as a share of
the realized assets (Sec. 1 et seq. Insolvenzrechtliche Verguetungsverodnung
(InsVV)). From this compensation, the insolvency administrator has to pay his
general administrative costs (Sec. 4 InsVV). However, in the event of a highly
complex procedure, a reorganization of the firm or a preparation of an insolvency
plan, the insolvency court can individually adjust the compensation parameters
(Sec. 3 InsVV and Haarmeyer et al. (2007), to Sec. 3, Note 8 et seq.).
1 Insolvency administrators or trustees are most frequent in European countries. See Appendix A for a
comparison of selected international insolvency procedures.
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In addition, the insolvency administrator’s incentives contain elements other than
monetary remuneration. These are the uncompensated costs or non-monetary
benefits of the insolvency administrator. Uncompensated costs arise from litigation
or liability risks (for example, Sec 60 InsO and Brandes/Schoppmeyer, in: Kirchhof
et al. (2014), to Sec. 60, Note 89–91). Legal liabilities and litigation costs are
prevalent in reorganizations because the insolvency administrator has to manage the
bankrupt firm and to develop a sustainable business model in a continuation. During
this task, creditors may believe that the administrator’s decisions are negligent or
wrong. Additionally, he vouches for all debt issued during the insolvency. Thus,
creditors may sue the insolvency administrator for damage payments as a party with
deep pockets and not only in situations in which a reorganization plan fails.
In contrast to uncompensated costs, reputational effects may imply non-monetary
benefits. Reputation arises primarily in a reorganization of the insolvent firm
because the insolvency administrator can demonstrate his ability to develop a
sustainable business model and to maintain the firm as a going concern.
Restructuring a firm under time constraints is a highly complex task. The
insolvency administrator has to develop a profound, firm-specific understanding in a
very short time. Hence, he needs high cognitive skills and high managerial know-
how. Therefore, the reorganization of an insolvent firm can be seen as a positive
signal that helps the insolvency administrator be assigned to profitable future
insolvency procedures. For example, the German government implemented an
insolvency law reform in 2011 intended to encourage the reorganization of insolvent
firms.2 This amendment also affects the value of the insolvency administrator’s
reputation: Prior to the reform, the insolvency court assigned an insolvency
administrator to the insolvent firm. The court had to choose the insolvency
administrator from a list and, thus, had considerable leeway. Overall, this process
was rather obscure. Under the new law, creditors can propose an insolvency
administrator (Sec. 56a InsO).
3 The game between the insolvency administrator and the creditor
The discussion of the German insolvency code in Sect. 2 and Table 1 in Appendix A
reveals the following stylized facts concerning the interactions between the
insolvency administrator and the creditors:
1. Insolvency administrators are better informed about the future options of the
insolvent firm.
2. They propose the potential usage (liquidation or continuation), which has to be
approved by the creditors.
3. The insolvency administrator’s compensation can entail fixed and variable
components, depending on the value of assets under continuation or liquidation.
We consider these stylized facts in a Bayesian sequential game between the
insolvency administrator and a creditor. To rule out different interests and free-rider
2 ‘‘Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen’’ (ESUG).
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problems among creditor groups, we model the multitude of creditors typical for
real-world insolvency cases as a single player.
At the beginning of the game, a firm declares insolvency, and the official
insolvency procedure starts. Figure 1 summarizes and illustrates the game. First, the
insolvency court delegates the responsibility and management of the insolvent firm
to an insolvency administrator. During this time, the insolvency administrator
privately obtains information on the viability of the firm, denoted by h. We
understand that firms with high h exhibit high viability: they have a sustainable
business model and good future prospects. Low h means the opposite: these firms
cannot survive in the market on a sustainable basis. The creditor does not obtain this
information but has a prior belief about h, given by a uniform distribution with
support by [0, 1].
With knowledge of h, the insolvency administrator can determine the value of the
firm’s assets depending on liquidation or continuation. In a continuation, the firm is
reorganized and operations continue. A liquidation will result in a sale of the assets
and in a shutdown of the firm. For the sake of simplicity, we normalize the
liquidation value to 1. The value in a continuation increases with h but is not
perfectly predictable as a result of uncertain future events. In a continuation, the
value accounts for 2hþ e with EðeÞ ¼ 0, VarðeÞ ¼ r2 and Covðh; eÞ ¼ 0. Thus, the
expected continuation value is 2h. Due to our assumptions, liquidation values are
higher for small h and continuation values for large h. Both expected values are
equal at h ¼ 1=2.
In the next stage, the insolvency administrator reports his favoured option to the
creditor. The creditor then decides whether to follow or to reject the proposal. This
decision critically depends on the creditor’s conditional expected payoffs for both
alternatives, which we derive below. If the creditor accepts the proposal, the
insolvency administrator will carry out his decision and the game ends.
Motivated by the discussion of the German insolvency code, we assume that the
insolvency administrator’s payoff is proportional to the value realized in the
insolvency procedure.3 The shares can depend on liquidation and continuation and
are denoted as b0 (liquidation) and b1 (continuation). To keep things simple, we
abstract from any direct expenses of the insolvency administrator for preparing and
performing the plan if the plan is accepted by the creditors and implemented.
However, we consider expected uncompensated costs (uL; uC) and non-monetary
benefits (rL; rC) in our model. As motivated in Sect. 2, we assume that uL ¼ 0 and
rL ¼ 0 in a liquidation scenario. In a continuation scenario, we define uC ¼ uðhÞ and
rC ¼ rðhÞ. Uncompensated costs typically decrease in h because litigation and
liability risks become less likely for high h. For the sake of simplicity, we set
uðhÞ ¼ ð1 hÞu. We also assume that the non-monetary benefits increase in h
because an insolvency administrator can better demonstrate his abilities to maintain
a firm as going concern for more valuable firms. Again, we assume a linear relation
and set rðhÞ ¼ hr and obtain hr  ð1 hÞu as the total amount of uncompensated
costs and benefits.
3 We discuss a fixed compensation that differentiates only between liquidation and continuation and
between a compensation—inducing no filtering failure—and optimal creditor satisfaction in Sect. 5.
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If the creditors accept the insolvency administrator’s proposal, the game ends and
we can define the payoffs of both parties depending on liquidation and continuation.
The insolvency administrator’s payoffs for continuation and liquidation are
pIAðh; b1; e; u; rÞ ¼ b1½2hþ e  ð1 hÞuþ hr ð1Þ
and
pIAðb0Þ ¼ b0: ð2Þ
The creditor’s payoff for continuation and liquidation are given by
pCðh; b1; eÞ ¼ ð1 b1Þ½2hþ e ð3Þ
and
pCðb0Þ ¼ 1 b0: ð4Þ
The game continues if the creditor rejects the insolvency administrator’s proposal
and asks for continuation upon a liquidation proposal and vice versa. In this case,
the insolvency administrator can either follow the creditor’s proposal or terminate
his assignment. In both cases, the rejection of the proposal creates disutility K for
the insolvency administrator because he prefers not to work for the trash can. K may
also represent costly negotiations with the creditors that especially appear in case of
a plan rejection.
The insolvency administrator will always follow the creditor’s claim for a
liquidation as long as b0 0. In the event of a continuation claim (instead of a
proposed liquidation), the insolvency administrator will leave the job if
Fig. 1 Bayesian game between insolvency administrator (IA) and creditor (C). After observing h, the
insolvency administrator can propose liquidation (L) or continuation (R). The creditor can confirm the
proposal (claiming R upon R or L upon L) or reject (claiming L on R or R on L). In the event of a
rejection, the insolvency administrator may accept the creditor’s claim or terminate
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2b1h ð1 hÞuþ hr  K\ K , h\
u
2b1 þ uþ r
:¼ hP: ð5Þ
As a result of the termination, a new insolvency administrator is hired. The new
insolvency administrator will also propose liquidation because h\hP. Without
explicit modelling, we simply assume that the creditor always accepts liquidation
because the resignation of the first insolvency administrator is a credible signal.
4 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we examine the equilibria of the game between the insolvency
administrator and the creditor. The equilibrium concept used is perfect Bayesian or
sequential equilibrium, as the game is similar to a signalling game. In our model, the
creditor will use the insolvency administrator’s proposal as a signal and he will
update his beliefs about h. Using the updated beliefs, he will accept or reject the
proposal. Under perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the insolvency administrator’s
reporting strategy and the creditor’s reaction to the report are best responses given
Bayesian updating.
This paper focusses on two questions: (1) How does the insolvency adminis-
trator’s compensation influence the separation of viable from unviable financially
distressed firms, such that no filtering failure occurs? (2) Can no filtering failure and
optimal creditor satisfaction be implemented simultaneously by an appropriate
compensation regime? As a first consequence of this focus, we concentrate our
analysis on separating equilibria and do not consider any pooling equilibrium, as
pooling equilibria will never be efficient. In a separating equilibrium, the insolvency
administrator proposes liquidation for a subset HL 2 H ¼ ½0; 1 and continuation of
the firm for HC ¼ HnHL. As a second consequence of our focus, we restrict our
attention to those values of b0 for which a compensation parameter b

1ðb0Þ exists,
such that b0 and b

1ðb0Þ induce a no filtering failure equilibrium.
Depending on the compensation parameters, we identify three different types of
separating equilibria in our model, which are characterized as follows:
1. Pure strategy equilibrium: The insolvency administrator proposes liquidation if
0 h h and continuation if h\h 1. The creditor always accepts the
proposal. The pure strategy equilibrium without filtering failure is characterized
by h ¼ 1
2
.
2. Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation: The insolvency
administrator proposes liquidation if 0 h h and continuation if h\h 1.
The creditor always accepts the liquidation proposal and accepts continuation
with probability pr.
3. Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation: The insolvency
administrator proposes liquidation if 0 h h and continuation if
h\h 1. The creditor always accepts the continuation proposal and accepts
liquidation with probability pl.
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Proposition 1 states how the three different separating equilibria depend on the
compensation parameters b1 and b0 if uncompensated costs dominate ðu[ rÞ.
Proposition 1 Suppose that u[ r[ 0, and 0 b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ. Then, the
compensation parameters b0 and b1 induce the following equilibria:
1. A pure strategy equilibrium with h ¼ b0þu
2b1þuþr exists if b1 and b0 are such that
b
1
 b1 b1. The no filtering failure equilibrium h ¼ 12 is induced for
b1 ¼ b0 þ ur2 2 ðb1; b1Þ.
2. The mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation emerges if
b1\b1\b
max
1 . The threshold value is given by h
 ¼ b1b0
1b1 .
3. The mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation exists for
bmin1 \b1\b1. The threshold value is h
 ¼ 1b0
1b1 
u
2b1þuþr.
Proof See Appendix B. h
Proposition 1 shows that pure and mixed strategy equilibria exist for different
values of b1 and b0. Figure 2 illustrates the different equilibrium regions for u ¼ 0:4
and r ¼ 0:2 and helps to explain the intuition behind the results.
The dashed line depicts the compensation in the case of no filtering failure
b1 ¼ b0 þ ur2 . No filtering failure is induced because b1 exactly adjusts for the
uncompensated continuation cost u and non-monetary continuation benefits r. As
long as the difference between b1 and b

1 is not too large, a pure separating
equilibrium with inefficient liquidation or continuation exists. If b0 exceeds
1þ 3
2
ðr  uÞ ¼ 0:7, the separating equilibrium with no filtering failure can no
longer be implemented, as b1 exceeds b1. Increasing b1 beyond b1 creates stronger
continuation incentives for the insolvency administrator. The creditors counterbal-
ance these distorted incentives by stochastically accepting or rejecting the
continuation proposal. Thus, the mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted
Fig. 2 Pure and mixed strategy equilibria depending on b1 and b0 for u ¼ 0:4 and r ¼ 0:2
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continuation emerges. The opposite effect appears if b1 falls below b1. In this case,
liquidation incentives are relatively strong. As a consequence, the creditors do not
always accept the liquidation proposal, implying the mixed strategy equilibrium
with mistrusted liquidation.
Figure 3 displays the threshold values h, h and h depending on b1 in the
pure and mixed strategy separating equilibria for different values of b0 and u ¼ 0:4
and r ¼ 0:2.
We consider the pure strategy equilibrium ranges first. These ranges, given by the
interval ðb1ðb0Þ; b1ðb0ÞÞ, are shifted to the right with an increase in b0. Moreover,
the threshold value h starts above the no filtering failure level h ¼ 1=2 at b1 ¼
b
1
ðb0Þ and decreases in b1 because a higher compensation for continuation should
drive down the insolvency administrator’s preferences for liquidation.
In both mixed strategy regions, however, the thresholds h and h increase
with b1. Intuitively, one would expect decreasing thresholds similar to the pure
strategy equilibrium. However, the increasing h and h in b1 are indeed a
necessary property of the mixed strategy equilibrium. In both mixed strategy
equilibria, the threshold value is determined such that the creditors are indifferent
between liquidation and continuation upon receiving the insolvency administrator’s
liquidation (or continuation) proposal. A larger compensation b1 does not affect the
creditor’s liquidation payoff. However, it reduces the creditors’ expected profit,
conditional on continuation. Shifting the threshold value to the right enhances the
creditors’ expected payoff and, thus, counterbalances the reduction caused by the
increased compensation b1.
In the following Proposition 2, we analyse the separating equilibria in a situation
in which the non-monetary benefits exceed the uncompensated costs ðr[ uÞ.
Proposition 2 Suppose that 0\u\r, and 0 b0\ 2rþu4 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðru2Þ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
.
Then, the compensation parameters b0 and b1 induce the following equilibria:
Fig. 3 Threshold values h, h and h for b0 ¼ 0:05 (solid line); b0 ¼ 0:15 (dashed line) and u ¼ 0:4;
r ¼ 0:2 depending on b1
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1. A pure strategy equilibrium with h ¼ b0þu
2b1þuþr exists if b1 and b0 are such that
b
1
 b1 b1. The no filtering failure equilibrium h ¼ 12 is induced for
b1 ¼ b0 þ ur2 2 ðb1; b1Þ.
2. The mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation emerges if
b1\b1\b
max
1 . The threshold value is given by h
 ¼ b1b0
1b1 .
3. The mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation exists for
bmin1 \b1\b1. The threshold value is h
 ¼ 1b0
1b1 
u
2b1þuþr.
Proof See Appendix C. h
Proposition 2 is similar to Proposition 1 above. The threshold values for the pure
strategy equilibrium and mixed strategy equilibriums are the same. The only
noticeable difference from the case with u[ r is the upper limit
b0\ 2rþu4 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðru2Þ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
. The upper limit ensures that a pure strategy
separating equilibrium with no filtering failure can be implemented.
Similar to Fig. 2, Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium regions depending on b1 and b0.
As above, the pure strategy equilibrium will be valid if b1 moderately deviates from
b1. Moreover, the pure strategy equilibrium can exhibit inefficient liquidation or
inefficient continuation. Increasing b1 above the threshold value b1 induces the
mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation, and decreasing b1 below
b
1
implements the mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation.
The compensation parameters b0 and b1 can be designed such that the game
between the insolvency administrator and the creditor exhibits no inefficient
liquidations and continuations, provided that the regulator has information
concerning uncompensated costs and non-monetary benefits. However, the conse-
quences for the satisfaction of the creditor’s claims are thus far unclear and are
analysed in the next section.
Fig. 4 Pure and mixed strategy equilibria depending on b1 and b0 for u ¼ 0:2 and r ¼ 0:4
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5 Creditor payoff and insolvency administrator compensation
In the previous section, we analysed how the insolvency administrator’s compen-
sation influences the economic future of the insolvent firm. In this section, we
characterize the optimal compensation parameters b0 and b1 from the creditors’
perspective. We concentrate on creditors for the following reason: In many
jurisdictions, the purpose of insolvency law is to provide an institutional setting for
the satisfaction of the creditors’ claims. Thus, the insolvency administrator can be
seen as an agent of the creditors, and his compensation should be designed so that
the creditors’ satisfaction is maximized. Therefore, it is natural to analyse whether
optimal creditor satisfaction and no filtering failure can be achieved simultaneously
in our setting. We derive the expected creditor payoffs in the equilibria first:
– Mistrusted liquidation (b1 2 ðbmin1 ; b1Þ): The firm will be liquidated for h\hP.
Note that the threshold value h is determined such that
R h
hP
ð1 b1Þ2hdh ¼
R h
hP
ð1 b0Þdh. For h[ h, the firm will be continued.
Thus,
E½PCðb0; b1Þ ¼
Z hP
0
ð1 b0Þdhþ
Z 1
hP
ð1 b1Þ2hdh
¼ ð1 b0ÞhP þ ð1 b1Þð1 hP2Þ:
ð6Þ
– Pure strategy equilibrium (b1 2 ½b1; b1Þ): Liquidation appears for h\h
 and
continuation for h h. Thus,
E½PCðb0; b1Þ ¼
Z h
0
ð1 b0Þdhþ
Z 1
h
ð1 b1Þ2hdh
¼ ð1 b0Þh þ ð1 b1Þð1 h2Þ:
ð7Þ
– Mistrusted continuation (b1 2 ½b1; bmax1 Þ): The threshold value h is determined
such that
R 1
h ð1 b0Þdh ¼
R 1
h ð1 b1Þ2hdh. Thus,
E½PCðb0; b1Þ ¼ 1 b0: ð8Þ
Proposition 3 defines the creditor’s payoff-maximizing compensation parameters for
u[ r:
Proposition 3 Suppose that u[ r. Then b^0 ¼ 0 and b^1 ¼ ur2ð1þuÞ maximize the
creditor’s payoff and imply a pure strategy equilibrium with
h ¼ 1þuð1þuÞþð1þrÞ 2 ð12 ; 1Þ.
Proof See Appendix D. h
The values b0 and b

1, which avoid filtering failure, are intuitively appealing
because the first-order effects of the compensation parameters on the creditors’
payoff dominate. Liquidation causes no uncompensated costs, and thus, b0 can be
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set equal to zero in the optimal compensation. The compensation for continuation
has to be positive and is set such that the separating equilibrium is preserved.
Several properties of Proposition 3 will be highlighted in greater detail.
1. First, the payoff-maximizing b^1 is below the efficiency-inducing b

1. Thus,
maximizing the creditor’s payoff implies h[ 1
2
and induces inefficient
liquidation. Consequently, simultaneously maximizing the creditor’s payoff and
avoiding filtering failure is impossible. Only in case of u ¼ r optimal creditor
satisfaction and no filtering failure can be achieved simultaneously. Efficiency
losses appear for u[ r and rise in u r, as the discrepancy between the no
filtering failure threshold 1
2
and 1þuð1þuÞþð1þrÞ 2 ð12 ; 1Þ increases.
2. To investigate the efficiency losses further, we analyse the distributional and
welfare implications. That is, we compare the payoffs under optimal creditor
satisfaction with a setting in which the creditor’s payoff is maximized such that
no efficiency losses (no filtering failure) are induced. The payoffs under no
filtering failure4 are
E½ ~PC ¼ 5
4
 3ðu rÞ
8
and E½ ~PIA ¼ 3ðu rÞ
8
: ð9Þ
Summing E½ ~PC and E½ ~PIA yields 5
4
. Inserting b^0 and b^1 yields the expected
monetary (without u) payoffs under optimal creditor satisfaction as
E½PC ¼ 1þ 1þ r
2ð1þ uÞ 
1þ r
ð2þ 2uÞ þ ð2þ 2rÞ and
E½PIA ¼ ð1þ rÞðu rÞð2uþ r þ 3Þ
2ð1þ uÞð2þ r þ uÞ2 :
ð10Þ
Summing up yields
E½PC þ E½PIA ¼ 1þ 1þ r þ uþ ruðr þ uþ 2Þ2 
5
4
: ð11Þ
We proceed with r[ u. Here, the creditor’s payoffs are the same as in Proposition
2. Proposition 4 provides the optimal compensation from the creditor’s perspective.
Proposition 4 Suppose that u\r. For u[  1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
, the compensation
parameters b^1 ¼ 0 and b^0 ¼ 0 maximize the creditor’s payoff and imply a pure
strategy equilibrium with h ¼ u
uþr 2 ð0; 12Þ. If u\ 1þr2 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
, the com-
pensation parameters b^1 ¼ 0 and b^0 ¼ ð1uÞruð1þuÞ2ð1þrþuÞ maximize the creditor’s payoff
and imply a pure strategy equilibrium with h ¼ 1þu
2ð1þrþuÞ 2 ð0; 12Þ.
Proof See Appendix E. h
4 The values b0 ¼ 0 and b1 ¼ ur2 maximize the creditor’s payoff and induce no filtering failure.
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The intuition behind the optimal compensation given in Proposition 4 is as
follows: Because of the negative first-order effects of b1 on the creditor’s payoff, it
is reasonable to set b1 ¼ 0. The optimal compensation b0 depends on the difference
between u and r. For a small difference, it is reasonable to set b0 ¼ 0. For larger
differences, b0 ¼ ð1uÞruð1þuÞ2ð1þrþuÞ maximizes the creditor’s payoff.
We observe properties similar to Proposition 3:
1. The compensation does not counterbalance the insolvency administrator’s
continuation bias, as the resulting threshold values h ¼ u
uþr and h
 ¼ 1þu
2ð1þrþuÞ
are below 1
2
. Moreover, h decreases in the discrepancy between u and r, and
thus, inefficient continuation appears more frequently when the insolvency
administrator’s continuation benefits increase.
2. We can compare the creditor’s and the insolvency administrator’s monetary
payoffs under optimal creditor satisfaction and under no filtering failure. Given
no filtering failure and therefore efficient liquidation and continuation, b0 ¼ ru2
and b1 ¼ 0 maximize the creditor’s payoff. We obtain
E½ ~PC ¼ 5
4
 r  u
4
and E½ ~PIA ¼ r  u
4
: ð12Þ
The total monetary payoff is E½ ~PC þ E½ ~PIA ¼ 5
4
, and no deadweight loss occurs.
Optimal creditor satisfaction for u[  1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
yields the payoffs
E½PC ¼ 1þ ruðr þ uÞ2 and E½P
IA ¼ 0: ð13Þ
Summing E½PC and E½PIA yields 1þ ruðrþuÞ2  54. Inefficient liquidation and
continuation induce a deadweight loss of 1
4
ðruÞ2
ðrþuÞ2.
If u\ 1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
, the optimal creditor satisfaction yields the payoffs
E½PC ¼ 1þ 1þ uð2þ uÞ
4ð1þ r þ uÞ and E½P
IA ¼ ð1þ uÞ rð1 uÞ  u
2  uð Þ
4ð1þ rþ uÞ2 : ð14Þ
Summing both payoffs yields
E½PC þ E½PIA ¼ 5
4
 r
2
4ðr þ uþ 1Þ2 
5
4
: ð15Þ
Inefficient liquidation and continuation induce a deadweight loss of r
2
4ðrþuþ1Þ2
We further investigate the findings of Propositions 3 and 4 in a numerical example.
Figures 5 and 6 display the creditor’s and insolvency administrator’s expected
monetary payoff with respect to u for the optimal creditor satisfaction and the no
filtering failure scenario. The dashed lines represent the no filtering failure regime,
and the solid lines the payoffs under optimal creditor satisfaction. Both under
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optimal creditor satisfaction and no filtering failure, the expected creditor payoff in
Fig. 5 decreases in a higher discrepancy between u and r, as the insolvency
administrator must obtain a larger share of the pie. This observation is reflected in
Fig. 6, where the insolvency administrator’s (gross) payoff increases in the
discrepancy between u and r. For u[ r, this result is due to his uncompensated
costs. In the case of u\r, the insolvency administrator does not earn any rent as
long the discrepancy is not too large. For higher differences, he has to earn a rent to
make liquidation sufficiently attractive.
In Fig. 7, the total monetary payoffs under the two regimes are compared. The
efficiency loss is given by the difference between the dashed and the solid curve.
Unsurprisingly, the efficiency loss increases in the discrepancy between u and r.
Finally, we consider the insolvency administrator’s net payoff E½PIAnet ¼
R h
0
b0f ðhÞdhþ
R 1
h ðb1h ð1 hÞuþ hrÞf ðhÞdh ¼ hb0  ð1 hÞuþ ð1h
2Þ
2
ðb1þ
uþ rÞ depicted in Fig. 8. The net payoff will be larger for u\r, as in this case, the
insolvency administrator has reputational benefits from continuing the insolvent
firm.
Motivated by the insolvency administrator compensation observed in Germany
and several other European countries, our setting was restricted to a linear contract
based on the liquidation and continuing value so far. In the following, we look how
the results change when the continuation value is the insolvency administrator’s
Fig. 5 Expected creditor payoff
under no filtering failure (dashed
line) and optimal creditor
satisfaction b^0 and b^1 (solid
line) for u ¼ 0. . .0:4 and r ¼ 0:2
Fig. 6 Expected monetary
insolvency administrator payoff
(without u and r) under no
filtering failure (dashed line) and
optimal creditor satisfaction b^0
and b^1 (solid line) for u ¼
0. . .0:4 and r ¼ 0:2
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private information and, thus, not contractible. Therefore, the compensation is
restricted to fixed payments conditional on liquidation (b0) and continuation (b1).
Table 1 in Appendix A shows that fixed payments as insolvency administrator
compensation are also common in several European insolvency codes.
As above, we analyse the optimal compensation from the creditor’s perspective
and the resulting filtering failure. To be short, we restrict our analysis to the pure
strategy equilibrium and skip the mixed strategy equilibria. In the pure strategy
case, the outcome will be liquidation whenever b0[ b1  uþ hðr þ uÞ. It can be
seen that liquidation is preferred for low values of h. The insolvency administrator is
indifferent between the two alternatives if
b0 ¼ b1  uþ hðr þ uÞ , h ¼ b0  b1 þ u
r þ u : ð16Þ
Inserting into the expected creditor’s payoff yields
EðPCðb0; b1ÞÞ ¼ hð1 b0Þ þ ð1 h2Þ  ð1 hÞb1: ð17Þ
The partial derivatives are
oEðPCÞ
ob0
¼ 1
uþ r ð1 b0 þ b1  2h
Þ  h ð18Þ
and
Fig. 7 Expected total monetary
payoff under no filtering failure
(dashed line) and optimal
creditor satisfaction b^0 and b^1
(solid line) for u ¼ 0. . .0:4 and
r ¼ 0:2
Fig. 8 Expected total
insolvency administrator payoff
(net of u) under efficient
compensation (dashed line) and
optimal creditor satisfaction b^0
and b^1 (solid line) for u ¼
0ldots0:4 and r ¼ 0:2
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oEðPCÞ
ob1
¼  1
uþ r ð1 b0 þ b1  2h
Þ  ð1 hÞ ¼  oEðP
CÞ
ob0
 1: ð19Þ
From (18) and (19), it can be seen that b0[ 0 ) b1 ¼ 0 and b0 ¼ 0 ) b1 0.
Proposition 5 demonstrates the details:
Proposition 5 In a pure strategy equilibrium, the following fixed compensation
payments maximize the creditor’s payoff:
1. Suppose u\ 1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
. Then b^1 ¼ 0, b^0 ¼ ð1uÞruð1þuÞ2ðuþrþ1Þ and
h ¼ 1þu
2ðuþrþ1Þ.
2. In the case of  1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
\u\ 1þr
1r r, b^0 ¼ b^1 ¼ 0 and h ¼ urþu.
3. If u[ 1þr
1r r, b^0 ¼ 0, b^1 ¼ ð1rÞurð1þrÞ2ðuþrþ1Þ and h ¼ rþ2uþ12ðuþrþ1Þ.
Proof See Appendix F. h
Proposition 5 shows that maximizing the creditor’s payoff through fixed
payments will also induce filtering failure, except for u ¼ r. Basically, we observe
similar results as under linear contracts. For u r, optimal fixed compensation
exactly resembles Proposition 4. This observation is due to the fixed compensation
b^1 ¼ b^1 ¼ 0 in both cases. Since uuþr [ 12 and rþ2uþ12ðuþrþ1Þ [ 12, we also obtain a
liquidation bias if u[ r. However, the threshold values and also the expected payoff
to the creditors differ. Corollary 1 shows the details.
Corollary 1 Suppose u[ r and insolvency administrator compensation according
to Propositions 3 and 5. Then, the resulting threshold value h and the expected
creditor payoff is larger under fixed compensation than under linear compensation.
Proof See Appendix G. h
Under a fixed compensation scheme, the insolvency administrator’s liquidation
incentives are stronger and filtering failure occurs more often. Moreover, the
creditor would prefer fixed over linear compensation, which is quite intuitive:
Linear compensation induces high compensation in cases where non-monetary
benefits to the insolvency administrator are large. Overall, the linear scheme is
based on more information than fixed compensation, but from the creditor’s
perspective, it does not make use of it in an optimal way.
This situation changes if continuation and liquidation values are verifiable and
contractible and contract design is not restricted. In this case, a simple compensation
scheme exists that extracts the insolvency administrator’s expected rents in the limit
and induces no filtering failure at the same time. This scheme is given by a zero
fixed payment upon liquidation (b0 ¼ 0), and a combination of fixed and variable
payments conditional on the continuing value CVðh; eÞ ¼ 2hþ e written as Bfb þ
bfb1 CVðh; eÞ in the case of continuation. The fixed payment is Bfb ¼ u gEe½CVðh ¼
1
2
Þ ¼ u g and bfb1 ¼ g ðrþuÞ2 . The parameter g captures a sufficiently small
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positive (negative) payment in the case of continuation for h[ 1
2
(h\ 1
2
). It can be
seen that the insolvency administrators’ payoff, including uncompensated costs and
benefits, boils down to
u gþ g r þ u
2
 
 2h uþ ðuþ rÞh ¼ gð2h 1Þ: ð20Þ
If limg! 0 gð2h 1Þ ¼ 0 and gð2h 1Þ 0 , h 12 as long as g[ 0. Of course,
this scheme works because of the risk neutrality and unlimited liability of both
parties. Moreover, the insolvency administrator’s preferences represented by u and
r have to be observable and a verifiable and unbiased estimator of the continuation
value must be available.
The scheme presented above shows that optimal creditor satisfaction and no
filtering failure can be achieved simultaneously if the creditor and the insolvency
administrator individually negotiate the compensation contract without any
legislative constraints. However, a first best compensation scheme will generally
not be implementable by regulation because insolvency administrators differ with
respect to unverifiable uncompensated costs and benefits. Therefore, a presumably
more promising way to improve insolvency proceedings with respect to the conflict
of interest between creditors and insolvency administrator would be to control
uncompensated costs and benefits. We discuss this point in Sect. 6.
In summary, the results in this section are comparable to the second best outcome
of typical principal–agent problems. From this perspective, the interaction between
a creditor and an insolvency administrator can be seen as a setting in which the
principal hires an agent with different objectives and private information. The
creditor finds it too expensive to select a compensation for the insolvency
administrator that induces first best actions. The tension vanishes only if conflicts of
interest due to uncompensated costs and non-monetary benefits disappear.
6 Implications
The essential result in the preceding two sections states that insolvency procedures
coordinated by a better-informed insolvency administrator will never simultane-
ously achieve optimal creditor satisfaction and no filtering failure if the insolvency
administrator’s compensation is designed as typical in many insolvency codes. The
driving force behind this result is a conflict of interest between the creditor and the
better-informed insolvency administrator that originates from uncompensated costs
and non-monetary benefits. As discussed in the model description above, these
typically represent liability risks and non-monetary benefits, such as building a
valuable reputation from reorganizing and continuing the insolvent firm.
For example, liability risk arises because many decisions with a highly uncertain
future outcome must be made during the continuation. As a party with deep pockets,
creditors may sue the insolvency administrator for damage payments after an
unsuccessful reorganization, even if the administrator’s decision was reasonable at
the time it was made. Moreover, public attitude may claim higher liabilities for the
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insolvency administrator after a publicly observable continuation with bad
outcomes. The results of our paper imply that stronger liability regimes may be
counter-productive for overall welfare and the creditors’ payoff if higher liability
risks are not compensated by non-monetary benefits. Compensating higher liability
risk with increased monetary compensation in the event of a continuation may
induce efficient decisions at the cost of the creditor’s payoff.
The most important example of non-monetary benefits for an insolvency
administrator is reputational issues. Regulation has had a strong impact on the value
of reputation, as the following example shows. In 2011, the German government
implemented an insolvency law reform intended to encourage the reorganization of
insolvent firms.5 Prior to the reform, the insolvency court assigned an insolvency
administrator to the insolvent firm. The court had to choose the insolvency
administrator from a list and thus had considerable leeway. Ultimately, this process
was rather obscure. Under the new law, the creditor can decide which insolvency
administrator to choose.6 The reform will clearly change the value of reputation in
the event of a continuation decision. Insolvency judges might have preferences for a
reorganization of the insolvent firm because of negative public reactions to a
liquidation. Thus, they select insolvency administrators with a strong record of
reorganization. Creditors concentrate on the satisfaction of their claim and prefer an
insolvency administrator with a history of high insolvency dividends. Therefore, the
non-monetary benefit of a reorganization might have declined due to the reform.
7 Conclusion
This paper discusses the impact of the insolvency administrator on ex post
efficiency and creditor satisfaction in bankruptcy procedures. We incorporate
asymmetric information and incongruent objectives between a creditor and an
insolvency administrator into a sequential game. Our key result states that the
remuneration schemes typically used in insolvency proceedings will not allow a
compensation of the insolvency administrator that simultaneously avoids any
filtering failure and provides optimal creditor satisfaction. Optimal creditor
satisfaction will always imply false liquidation or continuation decisions due to
uncompensated costs or non-monetary benefits. The theory in this paper adds to the
literature a novel explanation for the emergence of filtering failure in insolvency
proceedings.
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6 cf. Section 56a InsO.
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Appendix A: Characteristics of International Insolvency Procedures
In all selected insolvency procedures, an administrator can influence the output of
an insolvency. We excluded procedures where the result is fixed at the time of filing
for insolvency. The evaluation is based on the different insolvency codes.7
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
Pure strategy equilibrium We start the proof with the pure strategy equilibrium.
Given the creditor’s equilibrium behaviour, the insolvency administrator (hence-
forth, IA) is better off under a continuation proposal if
b0 2b1h ð1 hÞuþ hr , h
b0 þ u
2b1 þ uþ r
¼: h: ð21Þ
The creditor will accept the proposal if the following two conditions hold:
1. The creditor will follow the continuation proposal if
Z 1
h
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
ð1 FðhÞÞ dh
Z 1
h
ð1 b1Þ2h
f ðhÞ
ð1 FðhÞÞ dh ð22Þ
holds. Reformulating yields
h ¼ b0 þ u
2b1 þ uþ r
 b1  b0
1 b1
: ð23Þ
The critical value b1 can be obtained by solving
b0þu
2b1þuþr
¼ b1b0
1b1
. The relevant
solution is given by
b1 ¼
b0  2u r
4
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðb0  2u rÞ2
16
þ b0ð1þ uþ rÞ þ u
2
s
: ð24Þ
Straightforward algebra shows that the condition b1[ b

1 ¼ b0 þ ur2 is equivalent
to b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ, which holds by assumption.
2. The creditor accepts the IA’s liquidation proposal if
Z hp
0
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dhþ
Z h
hp
ð1 b1Þ2h
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dh
Z h
0
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dh ð25Þ
holds. For h\hp, the IA is unwilling to continue the insolvent firm; thus, hp is
defined by 2b1hP  1 hPð Þuþ hPr ¼ 0 , hp ¼ u2b1þuþr. hP[ 0 is satisfied for all
u[ 0. Reformulating yields
h ¼ b0 þ u
2b1 þ uþ r
 1 b0
1 b1
 hP: ð26Þ
7 For the Hungarian Insolvency Code, see Franks and Loranth (2013).
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The critical value b
1
can be obtained by solving
b0þu
2b
1
þuþr ¼ 1b01b
1
 hP. The relevant
solution is given by
b
1
¼ b0ð1þ r þ uÞ þ u r
2þ 2u b0
: ð27Þ
Condition b
1
\b1 is equivalent to b0\
2rþu
4
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðru2Þ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
. We can show
that b0\ 2rþu4 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðru2Þ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
is dominated by b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ for all
u[ r, because both conditions are equal to b0\1 for u ¼ r. Taking the partial
derivatives of b0\ 2rþu4 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðru2Þ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
yields
db0
du
[ 0; db0
dr
\0 for all
values of u[ r. In contrast, the partial derivatives of b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ yields
db0
du
\0; db0
dr
[ 0. Thus, b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ dominates for all u[ r.
Finally, it remains to show that h\1 is satisfied for all admissible b1. As
h\1 , b1[ b0r2 , inequality
b
1
[
b0  r
2
ð28Þ
implies our claim. Inserting b1 and rearranging yield b0r þ 2u[  b20  2ur,
which is true for b0 2 ð0; 1Þ and u; r[ 0.
Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation First, the equilibrium
threshold value h is set such that the creditors are indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the IA’s continuation proposal. From
Z 1
h
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
ð1 FðhÞÞ dh ¼
Z 1
h
ð1 b1Þ2h
f ðhÞ
ð1 FðhÞÞ dh; ð29Þ
we obtain
h ¼ b1  b0
1 b1
: ð30Þ
Second, the equilibrium probability pr ensures that the IA strictly prefers a liqui-
dation (continuation) proposal for h\ð[ Þh and is indifferent between the two
alternatives at h ¼ h, which yields
b0 ¼ ð1 prÞðb0  KÞ þ prð2b1h  ð1 hÞuþ hrÞ
, pr ¼ K
K  uþ hðr þ uÞ  b0 þ 2b1h
:
ð31Þ
Apparently, K[ 0 ensures pr[ 0 and dh

1
db1
[ 0 implies h[ uþb0
2b1þuþr, inducing
pr\1 8 b1[ b1.
The condition h\1 yields b1\
1þb0
2
:¼ bmax1 . Moreover, simple algebra shows
that the interval ðb1; bmax1 Þ is non-empty for b0\1.
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Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation The threshold value is
obtained from
Z hp
0
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dhþ
Z h
hp
ð1 b1Þ2h
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dh ¼
Z h
0
ð1 b0Þ
f ðhÞ
FðhÞ dh:
ð32Þ
Rearranging yields
h ¼ 1 b0
1 b1
 hP : ð33Þ
To be valid, h ¼ 1b0
1b1  hP[ hP has to be satisfied. Rearranging this claim yields
a lower bound b1[
b0ðrþuÞrþu
2 1b0þuð Þ :¼ b
min
1 .
The probability pl can be obtained by equating
plb0 þ ð1 plÞð2b1h  ð1 hÞuþ hr  KÞ ¼ 2b1h  ð1 hÞuþ hr
, pl ¼ K
K þ u hðr þ uÞ þ b0  2b1h
:
ð34Þ
Again, K[ 0 and dh

1
db1
[ 0 ensure pl 2 ð0; 1Þ.
To ensure the existence of the claimed equilibrium, bmin1 \b1 has to be
established, which is true for b0 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
Pure strategy equilibrium The pure strategy equilibrium can generally be derived as
in Proposition 1. The threshold value h, b1 and b1 are the same.
We have to check b1\b

1 and b1[ b

1. Straightforward algebra shows that the
condition b1\b

1 is equivalent to b0\
2rþu
4
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð2rþuÞ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
, which holds
by assumption. Condition b1[ b

1, equivalent to b0\1þ 32 ðr  uÞ, is dominated by
the former condition because 1þ 3
2
ðr  uÞ[ 1 ru
2
¼ 2rþu
2
¼
2rþu
4
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð2rþuÞ2
16
q
[ 2rþu
4
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð2rþuÞ2
16
þ uðu rÞ
q
8 r[ u.
Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation The proof for the
mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation is exactly as in
Proposition 1.
Mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation The proof for the mixed
strategy equilibrium with mistrusted continuation is exactly as in Proposition 1.
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of two steps: First, we show that b0 ¼ 0 and b1 ¼ ur2ð1þuÞ
maximize the creditor’s payoff in the pure strategy equilibrium. In the second step,
we argue that the creditor’s payoff will never be larger in one of the mixed strategy
equilibria.
Step 1: The creditor’s payoff in the pure strategy equilibrium is given by
E½PCðb0; b1Þ ¼ ð1 b0Þh þ ð1 b1Þð1 h2Þ: ð35Þ
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to b0 yields
oE½PC
ob0
¼ oh

ob0
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
 
 h ð36Þ
and
oE½PC
ob1
¼ oh

ob1
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
 
 ð1 h2Þ: ð37Þ
A sufficient condition for
oE½PC
ob1
\0 can be obtained from
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
[ 0 ,
b1[
2b0 þ u r þ b0ðuþ rÞ
2ð1þ uÞ ¼
b1
ð1þ uÞ þ
b0ðuþ rÞ
2ð1þ uÞ :
ð38Þ
Inserting b1 ¼ b1 into b1[ b

1
ð1þuÞ þ b0ðuþrÞ2ð1þuÞ ) u[  b0. Thus, the creditor’s
payoff will be maximal for b1\
b1
ð1þuÞ þ b0ðuþrÞ2ð1þuÞ \b1. Now consider oE½P
C
ob0
:
oE½PC
ob0
\0 , b1\
ð2b0 þ uÞð1þ uþ rÞ  r
2ð1 b0Þ
¼ b

1
1 b0
þ ð2b0 þ uÞðuþ rÞ
2ð1 b0Þ
:
ð39Þ
Thus, b1\b

1 implies that b0 ¼ 0 will be optimal. We conclude that the optimal
compensation in a pure strategy equilibrium consists of b1\b

1 and b0 ¼ 0.
Inserting b0 ¼ 0 into oE½P
C
ob1
and b1 shows that
oE½PC
ob1
\0 holds in the whole interval
b1 2 ½b1; b1Þ. Thus, the optimal compensation in the pure strategy equilibrium is
given by b0 ¼ 0 and b1 ¼ ur2ð1þuÞ. The creditor’s payoff amounts to
E PCðb0 ¼ 0; b1 ¼
u r
2ð1þ uÞÞ
 
¼ 1þ 1þ r
2þ 2u
1þ r
ð2þ 2uÞ þ ð2þ 2rÞ [ 1 8u; r:
ð40Þ
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Step 2 It remains to show that the creditor’s payoff will not be larger in one of the
two mixed strategy equilibria. It is easy to rule out b1[ b1: In this case, the payoff
ð1 b0Þ is maximized at b0 ¼ 0 but smaller than 1þ 1þr2þ2u 1þrð2þ2uÞþð2þ2rÞ.
We also have to rule out the mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted
liquidation, which may arise for b0[ 0 and b1 2 ½b0ðrþuÞþur2þ2ub0 ;
b0ð1þrþuÞþur
2þ2ub0 Þ. First,
note that the interval is empty for b0 ¼ 0, as the upper and lower bounds are equal in
this case. Second,
oE½PC
ob0
¼ hP\0: ð41Þ
Third, the partial derivation with respect to b1 yields
oE½PC
ob1
¼ ohP
ob1
1 b0 
ð1 b1Þ2u
2b1 þ uþ r
 
 ð1 hP2Þ: ð42Þ
A sufficient condition for
oE½PC
ob1
\0 can be obtained from
1 b0 
ð1 b1Þ2u
2b1 þ uþ r
[ 0 , b1[
b0ðr þ uÞ  r þ u
2 b0 þ uþ 1ð Þ
: ð43Þ
Condition (43) is most strict at b1 ¼ bmin1 ¼ b0ðrþuÞþur2þ2ub0 . Inserting b
min
1 into
oE½PC
ob1
shows that
oE½PC
ob1
¼  ðrþ1Þðrþ2uþ3Þðrþuþ2Þ2 \0 holds in the whole interval b1 2 ½b
min
1 ; b1Þ.
Thus, the optimal compensation in the mixed strategy equilibrium is given by
b1 ¼ bmin1 ¼ b0ðrþuÞþur2þ2ub0 and b0 ¼ n. The creditor’s payoff maximizes if n! 0 and
amounts to
E½PC ¼ 1þ 1þ r
2þ 2u
1þ r
ð2þ 2uÞ þ ð2þ 2rÞ : ð44Þ
The payoff of the mixed strategy and the pure strategy equilibrium are equal for
b0 ¼ 0 and an empty interval b1 2 ½b0ðrþuÞþur2þ2ub0 ;
b0ð1þrþuÞþur
2þ2ub0 Þ. Consequently, the
pure strategy payoff will be greater for b0 ¼ n[ 0 .
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4
Again, the proof consists of two steps:
Step 1: The creditor’s payoff in the pure strategy equilibrium is given by
E½PCðb0; b1Þ ¼ ð1 b0Þh þ ð1 b1Þð1 h2Þ: ð45Þ
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to b1 yields
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oE½PC
ob1
¼ oh

ob1
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
 
 ð1 h2Þ
¼ 1
2b1 þ r þ uð Þ3
2 b0 þ uð Þ b0ðr þ uþ 2Þ  r þ u 2b1ð1þ uÞð Þð Þ  ð1 h2Þ
ð46Þ
and
oE½PC
ob0
¼ oh

ob0
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
 
 h: ð47Þ
A sufficient condition for
oE½PC
ob0
\0 can be obtained from
1 b0 
1 b1ð Þ2 b0 þ uð Þ
2b1 þ r þ u
\0 , b0[
2b1ð1þ uÞ þ r  u
2þ r þ u ¼
2b0
2þ uþ r þ
2b1u
2þ uþ r :
ð48Þ
Inserting the efficient decision compensation b0 ¼ b0 ¼ b1 þ ru2 into condition (48)
yields r þ u[  2b1, which holds for all r; u[ 0. Thus, the creditor’s payoff will
be maximal for b0\
2b1ð1þuÞþru
2þrþu \b

0.
Now consider
oE½PC
ob1
. A sufficient condition for
oE½PC
ob1
\0 can be obtained from
1 b0  1b1ð Þ2 b0þuð Þ2b1þrþu [ 0. At b0 ¼ 0, this condition is equivalent to
1 1 b1ð Þ2u
2b1 þ r þ u
[ 0 , 2b1ð1þ uÞ[  r þ u: ð49Þ
Thus,
oE½PC
ob1
\0 at b0 ¼ 0 for all r[ u[ 0. Furthermore,
o2E½PC
ob1ob0
¼ 1
2b1 þ r þ uð Þ3
4ru 2r þ 4u2 þ 6u 4b1 þ b0 4b1 þ 6r þ 6uþ 8ð Þ
	 

ð50Þ
continuously increases in b0. Therefore,
oE½PC
ob1
is most strict at b0 ¼ b0. Inserting b0
in
oE½PC
ob1
yields  6b1þrþ5u
4 2b1þrþuð Þ\0, which is true for all b1 2 ð0; 1Þ and r; u[ 0.
Thus, b0\b

0 implies that b1 ¼ 0 will be optimal. We conclude that the optimal
compensation in a pure strategy equilibrium consists of b0\b

0 and b1 ¼ 0.
Inserting b1 ¼ 0 into oE½P
C
ob0
¼ 0 yields the optimal compensation in the pure strategy
equilibrium:
b0 ¼
0 if u[  1þ r
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þ rÞ2
4
þ r
s
r  u uðr þ uÞ
2ð1þ r þ uÞ else:
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
ð51Þ
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The creditor’s payoff amounts to
E½PC ¼
1þ ruðr þ uÞ2 if u[ 
1þ r
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þ rÞ2
4
þ r
s
1þ 1þ uð2þ uÞ
4ð1þ r þ uÞ else
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
:
ð52Þ
which is greater than 1 8u; r.
Step 2 The creditor’s payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted
continuation again will be smaller, as the payoff is 1 b0 1.
It remains to show that the creditor’s payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium
with mistrusted liquidation does not exceed the pure strategy payoff. This may arise
for b0 2 ruþ2b1ð1þuÞ1þb1þrþu ;
ruþ2b1ð1þuÞ
b1þrþu
h 
. First,
oE½PC
ob0
¼ hP\0 8 u; r[ 0: ð53Þ
Thus, the optimal compensation is b0 ¼ ruþ2b1ð1þuÞ1þb1þrþu . Second, the partial derivative
with respect to b1 again yields
oE½PC
ob1
¼ ohP
ob1
1 b0 
ð1 b1Þ2u
2b1 þ uþ r
 
 ð1 hP2Þ: ð54Þ
A sufficient condition
oE½PC
ob1
\0 can be obtained from
1 b0 
ð1 b1Þ2u
2b1 þ uþ r
[ 0 , b0\
r  uþ 2b1ð1þ uÞ
2b1 þ r þ u
: ð55Þ
Condition (55) is most strict at b0 ¼ ruþ2b1ð1þuÞ1þb1þrþu . Inserting yields b1[ 
ru
2ð1þuÞ,
which is true for all b1 2 ð0; 1Þ and r[ u. Thus, the optimized creditor’s com-
pensation in the mixed strategy equilibrium with mistrusted liquidation for b0 ¼
ruþ2b1ð1þuÞ
1þb1þrþu and b1 ¼ 0 yields
E½PC ¼ 1þ u ruþ r þ u
2ð Þ
ðr þ uÞ2ðr þ uþ 1Þ ; ð56Þ
which is smaller than the payoffs in the pure strategy equilibrium for all r[ u.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 5
1. Inserting b^1 ¼ 0 and reformulating oEðP
CÞ
ob0
¼ 0 yield b^0 ¼ ð1uÞruð1þuÞ2ðuþrþ1Þ and
h ¼ 1þu
2ðuþrþ1Þ. b^1 ¼ 0 is equivalent to oEðP
CÞ
ob1
\0. This condition yields
u\ 1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
.
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2. This case will be valid only if both
oEðPCÞ
ob0
\0 and oEðP
CÞ
ob1
\0. Inserting b^0 ¼
b^1 ¼ 0 and reformulating yields  1þr2 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þrÞ2
4
þ r
q
\u\ 1þr
1r r.
3. b^1 is obtained from
oEðPCÞ
ob1
¼ 0 and u[ 1þr
1r r from
oEðPCÞ
ob0
\0.
Appendix G: Proof of Corollary 1
1. Suppose r\u\ 1þr
1r r. Comparing the critical values yields
u
uþr [
1þu
2þuþr , u[ r. Expected creditor payoff under fixed and linear
compensation is given by EðPCfixÞ ¼ 1þ uuþr  u
2
ðuþrÞ2 and EðP
C
linÞ ¼ 1
þ 1þr
2þ2u 1þr4þ2uþ2r. The expression EðPCfixÞ  EðPClinÞ[ 0 is equivalent to
ðu rÞð2ru2 þ uð3r2 þ 4r  1Þ þ r3 þ 2r2 þ rÞ[ 0 $ 2ru2
þ uð3r2 þ 4r  1Þ þ r3 þ 2r2 þ r[ 0: ð57Þ
Solving 2ru2 þ uð3r2 þ 4r  1Þ þ r3 þ 2r2 þ r ¼ 0 yields
u1;2 ¼ 1 4r  4r
2
4r

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4r  4r2
4r
 2
 r
3 þ 2r2 þ r
2r
s
: ð58Þ
The root term is negative for r 2 ð0:1317; 0:7673Þ. In this case, the polynomial in
the second part of (57) has no real valued root, and thus, (57) must be true. Consider
r\0:1317 now. One can show that
1 4r  4r2
4r

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4r  4r2
4r
 2
 r
3 þ 2r2 þ r
2r
s
[
1þ r
1 r r
ð59Þ
for all 0 r 0:1317, which implies inequality (57). If r[ 0:7673, then
1 4r  4r2
4r
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1 4r  4r2
4r
 2
 r
3 þ 2r2 þ r
2r
s
\r ð60Þ
which again implies inequality (57). Thus, EðPCfixÞ  EðPClinÞ[ 0 must be true for
all valid u.
2. Suppose u 1þr
1r r now. Inequality
rþ2uþ1
2ðuþrþ1Þ [
1þu
2þuþr is equivalent to
r2 þ ð1þ uÞr þ u[ 0, which is true for all u; r[ 0. Expected creditor payoff
under fixed compensation is EðPCfixÞ ¼ r
2þ6rþ4uþ5
4ðuþrþ1Þ . Inequality EðPCfixÞ 
EðPClinÞ[ 0 can be written as
ðr þ 1Þ2ðu2 þ ð1þ rÞu rÞ[ 0 , u2 þ ð1þ rÞu r[ 0: ð61Þ
The roots of u2 þ ð1þ rÞu r are
186 Business Research (2017) 10:159–187
123
u1;2 ¼  1þ r
2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ r
2
 2
þr
s
: ð62Þ
Apparently, we obtain a positive and a negative root. We can show that the positive
root  1þr
2
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð1þr
2
Þ2 þ r
q
must be smaller than r. Since u[ r, EðPCfixÞ 
EðPClinÞ[ 0 is established.
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